




# Zeek known services classification - ZTA edition

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Fatema Bannat Wala  
Security Engineer @ ESnet/LBNL

# Esnet Architecture





# What are known services in Zeek?

- An active service is defined as an IP address and port of a server for which
  - A TCP handshake (SYN+ACK) is observed, Or
  - assumed to have been done in the past (started seeing packets mid-connection, but the server is actively sending data), Or
  - sent at least one UDP packet.
- If a protocol name is found/known for service, that will be logged, but services whose names can't be determined are also still logged.



# What are known services in Zeek?

- Zeek generates `known_services.log` file based on the pre-loaded script `policy/protocols/conn/known-services.zeek`

Ex:

```
$cat known_services.log
```

#fields	ts	host	port_num	port_proto	service
#types	time	addr	port	enum	set[string]
	1665718175.791134	10.20.0.111	80	tcp	HTTP
	1665718175.880135	10.20.0.130	443	tcp	SSL
	1665718175.880154	10.20.0.130	22	tcp	SSH
	1665718175.880198	10.20.0.130	123	udp	NTP

# How known services detected in Zeek?



```
## The hosts whose services should be tracked and logged.  
## See :zeek:type:`Host` for possible choices.  
option service_tracking = LOCAL_HOSTS;
```

```
function known_services_done(c: connection)  
{  
    local id = c$id;  
  
    if ( ! addr_matches_host(id$resp_h, service_tracking) )  
        return;
```

Checks if the Dest IP  
is in LOCAL\_HOSTS



# known services for east-west traffic

- Problem assessing the attack surface
  - Open to the **internet**? Or
  - Open to the **internal network**?

conn.log:

```
1665713319.241928 CW2WfF3Mz3XSBIbdy1 198.129.x.x 35470 198.128.y.y 22 tcp ssh  
0.05614495277404785 1461 1250 SF 0 ShADTdtAff 16 3770 14 3244 zeek-west-w7
```

known\_services.log:

```
1665713319.128558 198.128.y.y 22 tcp SSH -> open to only internal net
```





# known services for east-west traffic

- Now we can get a terse list of services that are “only” open to the internet..

## Known\_services.log stats

`Is_orig_local =>`

Values	Count	%	
True	2,240	96.76%	
False	75	3.24%	-> open to the internet



# Egress traffic filtering - Zero Trust

- So far, filtering the inbound connections based on the services doesn't need to be open to the internet
- Egress traffic filtering - Restrict the outbound access to the internet based on what is needed and what is not
- How? - Figure out what services are required access, block rest on a network firewall
- Solution? - Use Zeek to detect known outbound services



# Known services outbound detection - Zeek

- Known services outbound
  - checks for id.resp\_h NOT to be in Local\_hosts

```
function KnownOut::known_services_done(c: connection)
{
  local id = c$id;

  if ( addr_matches_host(id$resp_h, Known::service_tracking) )
    return;
```

Custom known services, but flipped!



# Known services detection - Zeek

## Use-cases:

Local hosts/services  
open to the internet

Case	Orig IP	Resp IP	IS_ORIG_LOCAL	Logging	service
1	LOCAL	LOCAL	TRUE	known_services.log	LOCAL/INBOUND
2	INTERNET	LOCAL	FALSE	known_services.log	INTERNET/INBOUND
3	LOCAL	INTERNET	TRUE	known_services_outbound.log	LOCAL/OUTBOUND
4	INTERNET	INTERNET	FALSE	known_services_outbound.log	INTERNET/OUTBOUND

Internet hosts/services  
accessed by the local hosts

case no. 4 should never happen, but if does, then it will be logged.



# Interesting Investigations - Egress traffic

- Statistical summary
  - Only ~12-15 services detected outbound
  - Investigated those services, resulted in interesting findings!

service{}	count	percent	is_local_orig
DNS	157404	73.384555	T
SSL	35870	16.723234	T
NTP	1776	0.828003	T
HTTP	1534	0.715178	T
SSH	250	0.116554	T
SMTP	160	0.074595	T
AYIYA	90	0.04196	T
OWAMP	78	0.036365	T
FTP	7	0.003264	T
IRC	1	0.002331	T

# Investigation #1 - Outbound HTTP connections



- Seen in the traffic: Most of our ubuntu servers were connecting to “[security.ubuntu.com](https://security.ubuntu.com)” for updates
- Cause: The source lists running had defaults debian repos enabled that pointed to the [security.ubuntu.com](https://security.ubuntu.com) for updates



# Investigation #1 - Outbound HTTP connections

- Reason: Turns out a config error in ansible that deployed the repo settings on those servers.
- Resolution: A ticket to the INF team to fix the typo in the ansible code and point them to `linux.mirrors.es.net`.



## Investigation #2 - Outbound IRC connection

- Seen in the traffic: One of our servers seen connecting to some IP in China on port 6669.

conn.log:

```
1662952332.859229 CotCBF3ujyxiin97U8 198.129.224.35      80      118.78.68.8
                   6669      tcp      irc      23.647002 392804   147      OTH      -      -
                   0      HadADTT  49      66412    137      7715     -
```

- Cause: Zeek missed initial syn of the TCP connection hence the connection was detected as outbound.
- But is it really IRC?



## Investigation #2 - Outbound IRC connection

- weirds to the rescue!!!
- weird.log is all about invalid content in IRC, which is true bcoz the connection isn't actually IRC:

```
#types      time  string  addr  port  addr  port  string      string  bool string  string
198.129.224.35 80    118.78.68.8 6669  connection_originator_SYN_ack - F zeek TCP
198.129.224.35 80    118.78.68.8 6669  irc_line_too_short - F zeek IRC
198.129.224.35 80    118.78.68.8 6669  irc_invalid_reply_number - F zeek IRC
198.129.224.35 80    118.78.68.8 6669  irc_invalid_command - F zeek IRC
198.129.224.35 80    118.78.68.8 6669  irc_line_size_exceeded - F zeek IRC
```

<It was actually a inbound HTTP request to linux.mirrors.es.net to get CentOS 7 iso>



## Investigation #2 - Outbound IRC connection

Resolution: There was a PR by Vern to actually flip the connection if the initial syn is lost but the connection looks legit:

v5.0.2 and older:

1662952332.859229	CotCBF3ujyxiin97U8	198.129.224.35	80	118.78.68.8	6669	tcp	
irc	23.647002	392804	147	OTH	-	0	HadADTT
	49	66412	137	7715	-		

v5.1.0-rc1:

1662952332.859229	CZin6InXYMITfpPVj	118.78.68.8	6669	198.129.224.35	80	tcp	
irc	23.647002	147	392804	OTH	-	0	^hADadtt
	138	7783	48	66344	-		

But, the weirds reported were same, as it was still detected as IRC..



## Investigation #2 - Outbound IRC connection

Resolution: Thanks to JAzoff for helping troubleshoot.. :-)

Submitted a bug report to fix the analyzer\_confirmation once the connections are flipped.

The bug has been fixed and now the application protocol is correctly detected.

Zeek v5.2:

```
1662952332.859229 CZhhjInXYytKjyhSd 118.78.68.8 6669 198.129.224.35 80 tcp
http      23.647002147      392804  OTH      -        -        0      ^hADadtt
          138      7783      48      66344   -
```



# Summary

- Still investigating some potential miss-configurations with the network tapping.
- A decent idea of the internet services our systems are using.
- Nice to verify SSH/SMTP and other services work as expected.



# Where to find the scripts?

Available via zkg install:

```
# zkg install Zeek-Known-Services-With-OrigFlag
```

```
# zkg install zeek-outbound-known-services-with-origflag
```

OR

Scripts:

```
https://github.com/esnet-security/Zeek-Known-Services-With-OrigFlag
```

```
https://github.com/esnet-security/zeek-outbound-known-services-with-origflag
```



Thanks for attending!  
Questions?